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Abstract
A common reform used to increase consumer choice and competition in public services has
been to allow private providers to compete with public incumbents. However, there remains
a concern that not all consumers are able to benefit equally from wider choice. We consider
the case of publicly funded elective surgery in England, where reforms in the 2000s enabled
privately owned hospitals to enter the market. We show that, post-reform, poor and ethnic
minority patients were much less likely to choose private hospitals; and that dominant drivers of
sorting between public and private providers are health based criteria for treatment by private
providers and the geographic distribution of hospitals. Counterfactual simulations suggest
differences in health explain 18% of the difference in the use of private providers between
rich and poor patients, while the geographic distribution of hospitals explains 61% once other
sorting mechanisms - ethnicity, patient preferences, physician referral patterns - are accounted
for. Although much of the observed sorting does not appear to be the result of market frictions,
limited variation in payments made to hospitals according to patient health means that sorting
is estimated to cost public hospitals in excess of £426,426 ($625,000) per year.
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1 Introduction
Recent reforms in many countries have sought to increase the role of consumer choice in
public services such as education and health care. At a time when government finances
are severely constrained, choice is viewed as a mechanism for driving competition between
providers and thereby, in a system with fixed prices, delivering improvements in quality and
efficiency. One type of reform employed to promote choice has been to increase the options
available to consumers by allowing entry from private sector or for-profit providers (Besley
and Ghatak, 2003; Blo¨chliger, 2008; Hoxby, 2003). Examples include Charter schools in the
US and Sweden (Asth et al., 2013; Bo¨hlmark and Lindahl, 2015; Ladd, 2002); and publicly
funded health care systems, like the English National Health Service (NHS) studied in this
paper1.
Policies to increase choice have often proved controversial. Debates typically surround
two related sets of issues. The first and most widely studied is the impact of choice on
competition, and the effect of that competition on hospital level outcomes (Cooper et al.,
2011; Deming et al., 2014; Gaynor et al., 2016). The second is the distributional impact of
choice reforms, and in particular whether disadvantaged consumers are less able to engage
in choice (Altonji et al., 2015; Urquiola, 2005). It is this second set of concerns that we
focus upon on this paper. Differential sorting across provider types may be of concern for
at least three reasons. First, if disadvantaged groups are less likely to use new providers due
to market imperfections such as incomplete information, sorting may imply welfare losses.
Second, where markets for different types of providers become segmented, the degree of
competition between providers may be muted. And third, when public reimbursements for
services are largely capitated, then how different types of consumers sort across providers has
important implications for the distribution of public funds, provider profits and competition.
The case we consider is how and why patients sort across hospital types following reforms
to the English National Health Service (NHS) in the 2000s, which increased choice by allowing
privately-owned hospitals, or Independent Sector Providers (ISPs), to enter the market for
publicly funded health care. These privately-owned hospitals typically have shorter waiting
times, higher patient satisfaction and arguably higher clinical quality2.
1In the US system, except for the elderly and those on social benefits, provision is provided by private
managed care organizations, comprising health insurance and health care delivery. In that system, the
“public option”, blocked by Congress in 2010, was intended as a constraint on the private market place.
2See, for example, NHS Partners Network (2015), Care Quality Commission (2012) and Browne et al.
(2008). The Care Quality Commission (CQC) reports that 82 percent of private hospitals met all essentials
standards (including care and welfare, cleanliness and infection control, medicines management, monitoring
service quality, complaints) that were checked in inspections, compared to 77 percent of public hospitals.
Browne et al. (2008) that found, once adjustments are made for pre-operative characteristics, patients
undergoing hip replacement (and cataract surgery) at ISTCs achieved a slightly greater improvement in
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Our analysis uses National Health Service administrative records on patients that had
elective hip replacements in 2012/13. Hip replacements are used as the procedure is con-
ducted in large volumes and ISPs have gained a substantial presence in the market, treating
20% of patients and accounting for 38% of hospitals that treated publicly funded patients
in 2012/13. Our analysis focuses on the role of three different sorting mechanisms: (i)
the geographic distribution of providers, (ii) differences in patients’ underlying health, and
(iii) the role of the patient’s referring physician. Understanding the relative importance of
these mechanisms is important both for assessing the welfare implications of sorting and in
designing potential policy responses.
We start by identifying and quantifying differences in the use of privately owned providers
by patient characteristics. Descriptive evidence is then provided on the extent to which
each of distance, patient health and referring physician might explain these differences. For
patients in our sample, those living in the richest fifth of local areas are almost twice as
likely to choose an ISP (23%) as those living in the poorest fifth of areas (13%), while white
patients are more than twice as likely to choose an ISP (20%) as ethnic minority patients
(8%). However, patients from ethnic minorities and deprived areas live on average further
from ISPs, and are in worse underlying health, both of which are associated with lower ISP
use.
We next estimate a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model of hospital choice, where
patients are able to choose from a set of both public NHS and privately owned hospitals.
This allows us to take into account how characteristics of different patient types interact
with attributes of the hospitals in patients’ choice sets. The set of hospitals that patients
are able to choose between is defined in two ways. First, in a standard approach, which
defines choice sets based on distance and which we refer to as “distance choice sets”; and
second, by defining the choice sets by the prior referral patterns of the patient’s physician -
or general practitioner (GP) -, which we refer to as “GP choice sets”. This aims to capture
the important role GPs play as both the “gatekeeper” to elective hospital care, and the
main source of advice to patients (Boyle, 2013; Dixon et al., 2010). Consistent with the
findings in the hospital choice literature (Beckert et al., 2012; Capps et al., 2003; Gaynor
et al., 2016; Ho, 2006), the model estimates show that distance, waiting times and quality
emerge as significant determinants of choice. Alongside the observable heterogeneity, we also
identify significant unobserved heterogeneity across patients with regard to their sensitivity
to distance and their preferences for ISPs, relative to NHS hospitals. These results are robust
with respect to the two choice sets definitions we consider.
The final part of the paper uses parameter estimates from the model to conduct coun-
functional status and quality of life than those treated in NHS facilities.
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terfactual simulations to assess the relative contributions of the mechanisms we highlight.
We find that differences in underlying health, the geographical location of privately-owned
hospitals, and restrictions in choices offered to patients by GPs all have a substantial role
to play in the observed patterns of sorting. Our simulations suggest that differences in
health explain 18% of the gradient in the use of privately owned providers between rich
and poor patients and 56% of the difference between white and ethnic minority patients.
After removing differences in health, as well as other possible sorting mechanisms such as
ethnicity, patient preferences and GP referral patterns, what remains is the geographical
distribution of privately owned providers that explains 61% of the original income gradient
and 44% of the original differences in the use of private providers between white and ethnic
minority patients. The referral patterns of GPs explain about a fifth of the income gradient
but none of the differences by ethnicity. Very little of the sorting we observe is attributable
to differences in preferences once other patient characteristics have been taken into account.
In terms of welfare, sorting by health and geography appears consistent with patient
needs and preferences rather than market imperfections. The impact of restrictions placed
on choices by GPs is less clear. These restrictions may reflect differences in patient charac-
teristics unobserved to the econometrician, but may also reflect imperfect information, GP
preferences or administrative frictions. We find evidence administrative distortions to GP
referrals unrelated to patient health do affect referral patterns, but play only a small role in
the overall pattern of sorting that is observed.
Our last counterfactual focuses on the costs to NHS hospitals of sorting on the basis of
health. As in healthcare systems in most other developed countries, the majority of hospital
care in England is reimbursed through a Diagnosis-related grouping (DRG) system (Langen-
brunner et al., 2009). These systems typically have only limited variation in payments by
patient characteristics. Here we show that ISPs receive the same payment for most patients
as NHS hospitals, but treat patients with better underlying health who are less costly to
treat, based on predicted length of stay. We estimate that this raises public hospitals’ cost
by at least £426,426 ($625,000) in 2012/13.
Our work contributes to several existing literatures. Our principal contribution is to the
hospital choice literature (Beckert et al., 2012; Capps et al., 2003; Gaynor et al., 2012; Ho,
2006; Kessler and McClellan, 2000). Here we build on existing work by focusing on how
patients sort across hospitals, and on the distribution of welfare gains, rather than aggregate
changes. We also incorporate the introduction of private providers, which are not included in
other models of hospital choice in England (Gaynor et al., 2016)3. Our results provide three
main insights. First, the primacy of distance in a patient’s choice of hospital entails that
3Gaynor et al. (2016) consider CABG surgery and this is not a market where ISPs operate.
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the introduction of new providers can have distributional consequences. Second, there are
restrictions on choice that arise from frictions in the market and therefore distort consumer
welfare and limit competition4. Finally, we provide an estimate of the financial cost of sorting
when there is limited variation in payments to hospitals across payment types, which has
relevance to all healthcare systems where payments are based on DRGs.
Beyond healthcare, we contribute to the literature that considers the relationship between
choice and sorting in other services, such as school choice (Altonji et al., 2015; Bo¨hlmark
et al., 2016; Burgess et al., 2015; Edmark et al., 2014; Hastings et al., 2010; Hastings and
Weinstein, 2008; Urquiola, 2005). As in health care, reforms to increase school choice have
included offering parents wider formal choice opportunities, providing information on school
quality to aid choice (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008), and introducing charter schools and
school vouchers in countries such as the US, Norway and Sweden (Ladd, 2002). Our results
support the assertion that the geographic distribution and entrance criteria of new schools
are likely to have important implications for how students sort across schools. Where the
costs of educating pupils varies, any sorting of “cheaper” pupils to new providers could raise
the average cost of existing schools.
Finally, we add to the extensive literature on socioeconomic inequalities in health care
utilisation. In general, this literature finds pro-poor inequalities in the use of primary
care and community health services and pro-rich inequalities in the use of hospital care
(Cookson et al., 2012; Doorslaer et al., 2004; Morris et al., 2005; O’Donnell and Propper,
1991). However, the extent and the direction of these inequalities typically vary by country,
year and condition and are hard to generalize5. The literature on variation in the quality
and types of care received by different types of patients is smaller, but typically shows that
treatment is on average less intensive and of a lower quality for disadvantaged socioeconomic
and racial minority groups (Fiscella et al., 2000; Moscelli et al., 2015).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on
the NHS and the relevant policy reforms. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines
the model and empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results and a discussion of their
4While our study focusses on the choices made by patients, given the institutional, socio-demographic
and choice protocol setting they find themselves in, we note that an emerging literature is concerned with
structurally modelling choice protocols in which choice (or consideration) sets are restricted or heterogeneous
across decision makers, often in ways that are only partially observed by the econometrician. In the area of
choices in health care, see for example Beckert and Collyer (2016) and Gaynor et al. (2016). Abaluck and
Adams (2017) provide conditions under which utility and consideration set probabilities can be separately
identified without auxiliary data.
5For example, Cookson et al. (2012) find no change in the inequality in the provision of hip replacements
between 2001 and 2008 in England, but Kelly and Stoye (2016) find uneven growth in the number of hip
replacements by local area deprivation from 2002 to 2011, largely explained by changes between 2008 and
2011.
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robustness. Section 6 provides counterfactual simulations and cost calculations and Section
7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 NHS Policy Reforms and Patient Choice
The majority of health care in England is provided through the taxpayer funded National
Health Service (NHS), free at the point of use. In this paper, we study the market for NHS
funded elective hospital care.
On the demand side, patients access specialist hospital care via a referral from their
primary care doctor or General Practitioner (GP). In addition to acting as an agent for their
patients, GPs also operate as a “gatekeeper” to hospital-based care to manage demand. Since
the “patient choice” reforms of 2006 and 2008, GPs are required to offer patients a choice
of hospital when making a referral6. GPs may influence where patients are treated either
by pre-selecting the options that are presented to patients to choose from, or by providing
advice to help patients choose between the options presented (Dixon et al., 2010). The role
of GPs in determining how patients sort across hospitals is returned to in more detail in
Sections 3 and 4.
On the supply side, NHS funded hospital care has historically been delivered by state
owned and run NHS Acute Trusts, or hospitals7. This paper focuses on a set of reforms
introduced alongside the patient choice reforms that further extended choice by increasing
the number of providers or hospitals available to NHS funded patients. The NHS had
purchased small volumes of care from the private sector on an ad hoc basis for many years,
but reforms introduced between 2003 and 2008 formalized and greatly increased the access
of private providers to markets for NHS funded care.8
The reforms created two types of ISP. The first type, Independent Sector Treatment
Centres (ISTCs), were privately owned facilities under contract with the NHS to provide
diagnostic tests and elective procedures to NHS funded patients free at the point of use. The
introduction of ISTCs, from 2003 onwards, reflected the policy focus of the early 2000s on
reducing very long waiting times for elective care through strict waiting time targets. ISTC
6These reforms were motivated by both, the belief that patients valued the choice over their care, and
evidence that health care competition when prices were fixed could improve quality (Gaynor, 2006). A series
of work has found that this reform led to improvements in quality (Cooper et al., 2011; Gaynor et al., 2012).
7A NHS Acute Trust may be comprised of a single hospital or multiple hospitals within the same
geographic area.
8For hip replacements there also exists a small private pay sector, which accounted for a fifth of hip
replacements in 2002 (Arora et al., 2013); it is excluded from all analyses in this paper.
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contracts were therefore awarded in part based on local capacity constraints and waiting
times at local NHS hospitals. The objective was to use ISTCs to treat routine patients,
allowing NHS trusts to focus on emergencies and patients with more complex needs. As
ISTCs do not have intensive care facilities, there were restrictions placed on which patients
were eligible for ISTC treatment. This meant patients treated by ISTCs were on average
younger and richer than those treated by NHS providers (Bardsley and Dixon, 2011; Chard
et al., 2011).
The second type of ISP were existing conventional private hospitals, which had previously
received almost all their income from private pay patients. Reforms in 2008 allowed these
private hospitals to compete for NHS-funded patients, and treat private pay and NHS funded
patients alongside one another. This second expansion in the role of private provision within
the NHS reflected a greater policy focus on competition and choice post 2006, with ISPs
now viewed as a mechanism for increasing consumer choice and thereby putting pressure on
NHS hospitals to increase quality (Naylor and Gregory, 2009). Unlike ISTCs, the location
of these new providers was not a policy response to local capacity constraints. However, all
types of private provider had the same restrictions on eligibility based on underlying health,
as most private hospitals are not equipped to treat patients that might need intensive care
or have other complex needs.
During the period we study, both GPs and hospitals received NHS payments through
152 “Primary Care Trusts” (PCTs). These PCTs were publicly funded bodies who had
the responsibility of paying for the healthcare of all patients living within their designated
geographic area9. Payments to GPs were based on a capitation fee, plus a payment-for-
performance supplement, and were not dependent on referrals. By 2012/13 all hospitals,
whether NHS or privately owned, received payments based on activity, where payments
were based on a diagnosis-related grouping system. These payments are set nationally and
vary very little across providers10. However, the earliest ISTCs (“wave 1”) initially received
block contracts for a certain number of procedures and were paid even if these procedures did
not take place. These block contracts had all expired by 2012/13, but during their operation
GPs were encouraged by their PCTs to refer to these providers.
Figure 1 shows how ISPs spread across England between 2006/7 and 2012/13. In 2006/7
there were just 9 ISPs conducting at least 20 NHS funded procedures. By 2012/12 this had
9These organisations were established in 2002 to deliver a purchaser-provider split necessary to sustain a
market for healthcare.
10These are known as Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) in the US and Healthcare Resource Groups
(HRGs) in England. Prices or Tariffs are then set at a national level based on the average cost of providing
the associated care. Small adjustments are made to the payments received, based on length of stay and local
costs of living.
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risen to over 119, spread from Newcastle in the North East to Cornwall in the South West.
The number of NHS hospitals remained roughly stable at 200 throughout the period. The
reforms therefore increased the hospitals available to patients by more than half, and by
2012/13 a fifth of NHS funded hip replacements were conducted by ISPs.
2.2 Mechanisms of Patient Sorting by Provider Type
The structure of the reforms points towards three mechanisms that might generate differences
in the characteristics of patients by provider type, each of which suggests different policy
responses.
First, as patients must meet certain health criteria in order to be eligible for ISP treat-
ment, some differences in use by underlying health are inevitable11. As ill-health is correlated
with other patient characteristics, such as poverty and advancing age, we may expect these
groups to be less likely to use ISPs. Insofar as differences in underlying health reflect need,
this type of sorting may be an efficient allocation of patients across hospitals. The same type
of sorting might be expected in selective secondary or tertiary education, where children from
richer families typically have higher entry test scores.
Second, the geographic distribution of ISPs is non-random and is likely to result in
differential access to ISPs. In particular, after 2008 most new ISPs were existing private
hospitals. These were typically located in richer areas, close to the private-pay patients they
primarily serve. Again, given that patients always show a preference for shorter distances,
any resulting sorting may be efficient, taking the geographic distribution of ISPs as given.
Whether the geographic distribution is itself efficient is a separate question.
Finally, there may be market imperfections that affect where patients are treated. One
potential source of market imperfection are restrictions in the choices offered to patients by
their referring GP. As ISPs were new and introduced very quickly, GPs may lack information
about the additional providers, at least in the short run. The structure of the first wave of
ISTC contracts also provided an incentive for PCTs to encourage GPs to refer to ISTCs,
to avoid paying for procedures that did not take place. These types of frictions are at least
potentially inefficient, both in terms of restricting access of patients to ISPs and limiting
competition between providers. We will return to the issue of the options presented to
patients in Section 4.2.
In addition to concerns about potential welfare losses resulting from market frictions,
there are at least two further reasons why policy makers may be concerned about the sorting
of patients across providers.
11These regulations were laid down by the government. Whether ISPs then imposed additional eligibility
requirements that did amount to ‘cherry picking’ or ‘cream skimming’ remains open to debate.
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First, even if ISP use were based on complete information and absent administrative
constraints, policy makers may be concerned if choice leads to too much segmentation, or
indeed segregation, in public service utilization, given it is paid for by, and designed to serve,
all. Moreover, this segmentation may limit the extent of competition between NHS hospitals
and ISP, reducing the pressure on NHS hospitals to improve quality.
Second, the characteristics of patients carry implications for hospital costs. In particular,
the cost of treating patients with worse underlying health is typically higher, but there is
limited variation in payments that hospitals receive. For hip replacements, as with many
other procedures, there exist different clinical groupings and a higher payment for treating
patients that have complications and comorbidities. However, relatively few patients qualify
for the higher payment.12 Moreover, the costs of treating patients are likely to vary more
continuously with underlying health. Low cost patients moving from NHS hospitals to ISPs
and thereby leaving NHS hospitals to treat high cost patients may be regarded as an adverse
selection issue. This will generate negative spillovers for NHS hospitals, as it limits their
ability to cross-subsidize across patients, leading to the average cost of patients treated by
the NHS to rise while ISPs receive a surplus.
All these concerns depend upon the extent and type of sorting that takes places. Existing
evidence from early wave 1 ISTCs points towards ISPs treating younger, healthier patients
(Bardsley and Dixon, 2011; Chard et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2015).
The next section details our data and describes the patterns of sorting in 2012/13, by
which time almost all ISPs had been introduced.
3 Data
We use data on NHS-funded elective hip replacements. The data come from the NHS
inpatient Hospital Episode Statistics (HES). They provide an administrative record of all
NHS-funded inpatient treatments in England, including treatments provided by both NHS
hospitals and ISPs. Each patient record contains information on where the patient was
admitted, the date of admission and discharge, up to 20 ICD-10 diagnoses, and information
on any procedures that took place. For each patient record, HES data also identify the
referring GP practice, albeit not the individual GP. We extract hip replacements using
the relevant orthopaedic procedure codes, and obtain a sample of 68,769 patients.13. For
12In our sample, 75% of patients fall under HRG HB12C “Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category
1 without CC”.
13Hip replacements include those operations with Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS)
Classification of Interventions and Procedures Codes (4th Edition) beginning W37, W38, W39, W93, W94
and W95. Each operation code defines a different type of hip replacement. For a full list of OPCS codes see
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modelling reasons discussed below, we restrict the sample to those treated by hospitals that
conduct at least 20 hip replacements in a year, and those choosing a hospital from among the
nearest 10 providers. After improving these restrictins, we are left with a sample of 62,695
patients.
3.1 Patient Characteristics
Table 3 shows mean demographic and health characteristics by chosen provider type. The
average age of patients treated by both NHS hospitals and ISPs is 68. The share of ethnic
minority patients, which has not been examined by existing studies, is much lower among
ISP patients (1.3%) than among NHS patients (3.9%)14. This is consistent with qualitative
evidence on how patient choice operated during this period, where GPs voiced concerns that
language barriers may limit the ability of minority ethnic populations from exercising choice
(Dixon et al., 2010).
Two sets of measures are used to capture underlying health of the patient. First, we
consider the Charlson Index of comorbidities15 We group patients into three categories: a
score of zero for no comorbidities; a score of 1 for “mild comorbidities”; and a score of more
than one for “severe comorbidities”.
Second, we extract all prior admissions for patients in our estimation sample, and create
indicators for whether the patient had at least one (NHS funded) elective or emergency
admission in the three years (1095 days) prior to the hip replacement admission, for any
cause. All our measures confirm that ISP patients are on average less complex and have
better underlying health than NHS hospital patients16. It is however important to note that
the market is not completely segmented by underlying health: a substantial fraction of ISP
patients do have comorbidities or prior admissions.17.
here: http://www.surginet.org.uk/informatics/opcs.php.
14These shares are much lower than the share of people of an ethnic minority patients in the population,
due to the age structure of the ethnic minority population in England
15It is calculated using the comorbidities recorded at the point of the hip replacement admission. The
Charlson Index predicts ten-year mortality using 22 comorbidity conditions. Each condition is scored a 1,
2, 3 or 6, depending on the severity of the condition, and is calculated on the basis of all diagnoses recorded
in hip replacement admission. See Sundararajan et al. (2004) for more details on the Charlson Index.
16Comparing these measures with the reported underlying health recorded for the 60% of the sample that
responded the Patient Recorded Outcome Measures (PROMs) survey illustrates that the health measures
we use pick up different elements of ill health. Of those that report ever having cancer in PROMs, 79%
have had an elective admission to hospital over the previous 3 years, compared to 53% for all other patients,
emergency admissions were 10 percentage points higher (29% verses 19%), and cancer patients were twice
as likely to have a Charlson index score of 2 or more (15% verses 7%). By contrast, for those reporting
high blood pressure, the shares with prior emergency and elective admissions are both only 2 percentage
points higher than the rest of the sample, whereas the share of those with a Charlson Index of 2 or more is
6 percentage points higher.
17This is also true when we use the more detailed Patient Reported Outcome Questionnaire available for
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HES data do not contain any patient level socioeconomic information, but we are able
to embed characteristics at the neighborhood level via the patient’s postcode district and
LSOA.18 Socioeconomic status is measured using the neighborhood level Index of Multiple
Deprivation (IMD) as compiled by the Office for National Statistics.19 This measure allows
us to rank neighborhoods from the least to the most deprived. We rescale the IMD,
henceforth referred to as ‘deprivation’, to lie between zero and one. Higher values imply
higher deprivation. As documented by Chard et al. (2011) and elsewhere, ISP patients are
on average less deprived than patients that are treated by NHS hospitals. In our sample,
the average NHS patient lived in an area with a deprivation rank of 0.45, compared to 0.39
for the average ISP patient.
The final set of characteristics is the historic referral patterns of the patient’s GP. This
reflects the likely importance of the GP in the referral decision. From HES outpatient records
detailing GP practice referrals in 2011/12 in the Orthopaedics and Trauma specialty, which
is the largest specialty by volume in the NHS and contains consultants who would see joint
replacement patients, we calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the concentration
of referrals across providers for each GP practice.20 We also use all referrals from 2009/10
to 2011/12 to calculate the share of referrals to ISPs over those three years. Table 3 shows
that patients who choose ISPs are registered at GP practices with lower concentrations of
referrals. The average patient treated by an ISP was registered with a GP practice that
referred 13.2% of patients to ISPs, compared to an average of 7.6% for those treated by an
NHS hospital.
3.2 Hospital Characteristics
We construct hospital attributes for 314 hospitals in our sample, which conducted at least
20 NHS-funded hip replacements in 2012/13. Of these, 119 (or 38%) are ISPs. This share is
higher than the share of patients treated by ISPs of just over 20%, because ISPs treat fewer
patients per hospital (103 on average, compared to an average of 253 for NHS hospitals).
two thirds of the sample. Even for those who report having a previous stroke or heart attack, 10% have a
hip replacement conducted by an ISP.
18Lower Super Output Areas are statistical geographical aggregation units with no administrative
jurisdiction, similar to a census tract, and are designed to be as homogeneous as possible with respect
to population composition. They contain an average of 1,500 individuals. There are approximately 32,500
LSOAs in England.
19The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) is an local area based measure of deprivation produced by the
UK government that includes measures of income, employment, health deprivation and disability, education
skills and training, barriers to housing and services, crime and the living environment. We use the version
produced in 2010. Please see https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2010
for more details. This is the same measure used to capture the economic conditions as Gaynor et al. (2016)
20This is given by the sum of squared referral shares of each hospital that the GP practice refers to.
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Previous analyses of hospital choice in England and elsewhere have shown that distance
is the principal hospital attribute driving patient decisions (Beckert et al., 2012; Gaynor
et al., 2016).21 Figure 5 shows the distribution of patient choices, with hospitals ordered
by distance.22 The black bars indicate that 45% of patients chose their closest hospital and
82% chose amongst their closest three. When we exclude ISPs - which in some cases are the
nearest provider - and just look at patients that chose NHS hospitals, shown in the grey bars,
66% chose their closest NHS hospital and 91% chose from among their three closest. The
closest NHS hospital and ISP are on average 8.9km (s.d. 7.3km) and 12.7km (s.d. 10.8km)
away, respectively.
Further hospital attributes driving patients’ decisions are summarized in Table 2.23
We control for hospitals’ clinical quality using the ratio of 30-day all-cause emergency
readmissions for hip replacement relative to expected readmissions at the hospital level,
given the hospital’s case mix.24 A ratio of unity indicates that the rate of readmissions
is as expected, higher ratios imply higher than expected readmissions, i.e. lower clinical
quality. The mean readmission ratio is higher for NHS hospitals than ISPs. However, there
is substantial overlap in the distributions of readmission ratios across hospital types.
We also control for hospital quality more summarily, in terms of broad hospital type
categorisations. The first category comprises “early FTs”, i.e. NHS hospitals that became a
“Foundation Trust” (FT) up to and including 2006. Foundation Trust status allows hospitals
a degree of independence from the Department of Health. The first hospitals were granted
Foundation Trust status in 2004. These hospitals were typically of higher quality in terms
of both, management and clinical outcomes. In subsequent years, the majority of hospitals
have become Foundation Trusts, but as a consequence the average quality of FT hospitals
has declined. We use the cut-off of 2006 in our definition of early FTs as a measure of the
highest quality hospitals. 16% of NHS hospitals are classified as early FTs.
The second category comprises Specialist Orthopaedic hospitals. There are eight in total,
seven NHS hospitals and one ISP. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals treat a larger number
of orthopaedic patients, and they may be a particularly relevant alternative, not only for
21The same pattern exists for education choices and other public services (Burgess et al., 2015).
22Distance is measured in a straight line from the centroid of the patient’s Lower Super Output Area to
the hospital postal code.
23A large range of quality measures is recorded for NHS hospitals, but very few of these are available for
ISPs. All the quality measures we use are therefore constructed using the information available in HES. For
example, while PROMS data are relatively abundant for treatments at NHS hospitals, they are sparse for
treatments at ISPs. We therefore decided not to construct quality measures from PROMS data.
24Readmissions include any emergency readmission to any hospital for any cause within 30 days. Expected
admissions are constructed by regressing readmissions on age, sex, and prior admissions, and underlying co-
morbidities of hospital patients. We calculate average predicted readmission rates for each hospital and then
divide by the observed readmission rate.
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patients living nearby.
3.3 Descriptive Evidence on Sorting
Table 3 reveals that ISP patients are on average healthier, richer, more likely to be white
than those treated by NHS hospitals. Differences by health are to be expected, given that
there are health restrictions on eligibility for ISP treatment. Reasons for differences by
ethnicity and deprivation are less clear. In this Section we provide evidence on how the
three mechanisms we highlight - the geographic distribution of ISPs, underlying health, and
market imperfections - might explain the patterns we observe.
In Table 4, we consider the relationship between the location of ISPs and the gradient
in ISP use by deprivation. The Table shows the share of patients that have an ISP as the
closest provider and the share of patients that are treated by an ISP by local area deprivation
quintile for each year between 2006/07 and 2011/12. The share of patients who had an ISP as
their closest provider increased over time in all quintiles, with the largest increases between
2007/08 and 2008/09 and between 2009/10 and 2010/11. However, in all years the share of
patients living close to an ISP decreases with local area deprivation, with both relative and
absolute increases in the gradient after 2008/09. By 2013/13, 37.1% of patients living in the
richest fifth of areas have an ISP as their closest provider, compared to 22.1% of those in
the most deprived fifth.
Differences in ISP use by local area deprivation may be a consequence of where ISPs
are located or the patients that choose ISPs conditional on location. Table 4 shows that
the share of patients treated by ISPs increases over time, with particularly large increases
coinciding with the growth in the number of providers. In 2006/07 and 2007/08, ISP use
was fairly flat across the deprivation distribution. From 2008/09 onwards, ISP use declines
with local area deprivation, with ISP use substantially lower in the bottom two (poorest)
quintiles of distribution relative to the top (richest) three quintiles. The deprivation gradient
steepens somewhat over time, with the share of patients in the richest quintile 35% higher
than those in the most deprived quintile in 2008/09, rising steadily to 79% higher in 2012/13.
Calculating the share of patients who choose an ISP conditional on having an ISP as the
closest provider is stable over time and fairly flat across the deprivation distribution until
2010/11, after which a negative gradient developed. In 2012/13, 32% of those in the richest
quintile who had an ISP as the closest provider chose an ISP, compared to 22% in the most
deprived quintile.
There is a similar pattern in how ISPs are distributed across England with respect to
ethnicity. In 2009/10, 15.2% of white hip replacement patients have an ISP as their nearest
13
hospital, compared to 9.4% of ethnic minority patients. By 2012/13, this had increased to
31.9% of white patients and 25.1% of ethnic minority patients. Over the same period the
share of patients that were treated by ISPs increased from 12.6% to 20.4% for white patients
and from 5.7% to 8.2% for ethnic minorities. The difference between ISP use by ethnic
minority status is therefore not just the result of the geographical distribution of providers.
Ethnic minorities are less likely to choose ISPs conditional on location.
The second mechanism we highlight is the potential contribution of differences in under-
lying health to sorting. Figure 6 shows the share of patients that had a previous emergency
admission, mild co-morbidities and severe comorbidities, by deprivation quintile.25 As
expected, underlying health declines with local area deprivation. For previous emergency
admissions and mild comorbidities, the declines in health are largely confined to the most
deprived half of the distribution. There is a small difference in the underlying health
by ethnicity: the share of ethnic minority patients with prior emergency admissions is 2
percentage points higher than for the white population, and ethnic minority patients exhibit
slightly more comorbidities. Differences in health may therefore explain a part of observed
sorting, particularly by deprivation. The sizable differences by ethnic minority status appear
harder to explain. For example, the share of ethnic minorities that choose an ISP (7.5%) is
approximately equal to share of patients with both low income (living in the poorest fifth of
local areas) and poor underlying health (have a prior emergency admission) who choose an
ISP.
The final mechanism is potential imperfections, or frictions, in the market for NHS-
funded care. In particular, we focus on the role the GP may play in creating imperfections.
Table 3 highlights that there is a strong correlation between prior GP referral patterns and
choosing an ISP. Comparing the concentration of GP practices referrals across patients in
our sample shows that concentration does increase slightly with deprivation, with a mean
of 0.62 for those in the most deprived fifth of areas, compared to 0.58 in the least deprived
quintile 26. There is very little difference in mean concentration by ethnic minority status
(0.6 for the white population and 0.59 for ethnic minorities). Interpreting these differences
by GP referral characteristics is particularly difficult, as referrals are a function of multiple
mechanisms, including the size and composition of the local health economy, the needs of
patients, and potentially GP preferences and information sets.
Taken together the descriptive evidence in this Section indicates that the geographical
distribution of ISPs and the differences in population health are likely to explain some of the
differences in ISP use. However, understanding the relative importance of the mechanisms
25Here, the value 1 represents the least deprived quintile.
26The exception to this pattern is London, where concentration decreases with local area deprivation
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we highlight and accounting for differences in the characteristics of patients and the hospitals
available to them requires a model of hospital choice.
4 Econometric Choice Model
4.1 Patient Level Choice Model
We use a random utility model (RUM) to describe the patient’s discrete hospital choice
problem. We consider a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model that allows us to capture
a wide spectrum of patient level heterogeneity, exhibits unrestricted substitution patterns
and does not impose a correlation structure across choice alternatives.27.
Consider hip replacement patient i. Let g(i) denote i’s GP (practice).28 And suppose
that g(i) offers i to choose among a set of NHS hospitals Ng(i) and a set of ISPs Ig(i). Then,
patient i’s choice set is given by Jg(i) = Ng(i) ∪ Ig(i). Let Uij denote i’s indirect conditional
utility from having the procedure carried out at hospital j, j ∈ Jg(i), and consider the
specification
Uij = x
′
ijβi + ij,
where xij is a K-vector of hospital attributes that may vary across patients, such as distance
between patient and hospital. The vector βi is a vector of possibly random coefficients,
βik = βk + z
′
iθk + σkνik, k = 1, · · · , K,
where zi is a vector of patient level characteristics, σik > 0 for random coefficient and zero
otherwise, and νik is an independent standard normally distributed random variable. In this
model, βk + z
′
iθk captures the conditional mean of the random coefficient βik on hospital
attribute k, given patient characteristics zi, or the observed heterogeneity in i’s valuation of
attribute k. The contribution σkνik to βik, in turn, captures unobserved heterogeneity in i’s
valuation of attribute k. The term ij captures unobserved taste variation across hospitals
that is not quantified by hospital attributes xij. The collection {ij, j ∈ Jg(i)} is assumed
to be i.i.d. EV (0, 1). Patient i chooses the hospital associated with the highest indirect
conditional utility. Let Dij = 1 if patient i is observed to choose alternative j, and Dij = 0
27More tightly specified alternatives in the logit family, such as conditional or nested logit models, while
yielding more efficient estimates, embed the risk of being misspecified and consequently inducing inconsistent
estimators. As demonstrated by McFadden and Train (2000), an appropriately rich MMNL specification
can arbitrarily closely approximate any RUM for discrete choice. This flexibility renders it an attractive
econometric framework for analysis.
28In line with the informational content of our data, which identify a patient’s GP practice, but not the
individual GP, in much of our discussion we refer to GP and GP practice synonymously.
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otherwise. Then,
Dij = 1 ⇔ Uij = max{Uin, n ∈ Jg(i)}.
This model can be estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood (Hajivassiliou, 2000).
We include an ISP dummy among those attributes in xij that carry a random coefficient,
i.e. xijk = 1{j∈Ig(i)} and σk ≥ 0. Heterogeneity in sorting into ISPs then operates through the
interactions of xijk with zi. By controlling for i’s health and GP g(i)’s referral pattern among
zi, the model allows us to identify differential sorting, conditional on access and health, with
respect to other patient socio-demographics, such as ethnicity and neigborhood deprivation.
Our MMNL model endows two other hospital attributes with random coefficients: distance,
and the 30-day emergency readmissions ratio. Interactions with all continuous variables
are constrained to be linear, with the exception of local area deprivation where we include
separate terms for the most and least deprived half of the distribution. We also include
pairwise interactions between the hospital attributes.
4.2 Choice Sets
The choice model, as specified, assumes that choice sets Jg(i) may vary across GP practices,
but do not vary across patients within GP practice. For our application to hospital choice for
elective hip replacements, a definition of these choice sets is required. Even though hospital
choice for various elective procedures has been considered in numerous earlier studies, the
literature does not offer a clear cut approach to such a definition. This is notwithstanding
the fact that some authors emphasize that choice sets as considered by decision makers do
matter.29
We consider two definitions of the choice sets Jg(i). In line with standard practice (Beckert
et al., 2012; Ho, 2006), the first approach defines Jg(i) by distance to the GP practice as
patients predominantly choose hospitals that are nearby. The challenge is how to define the
appropriate distance cut-off or number of hospitals. The smaller the choice set, the more
patients will be dropped for choosing hospitals outside the choice set, but larger choice sets
may provide a large number of hospitals that are never considered by patients. Our definition
is based on the ten nearest hospitals conducting at least 20 procedures, plus all specialist
hospitals within 50km; we refer to choice sets according to this definition as “distance choice
set”30. The definition we use generates a sample of 62,695 patients, the average number of
29In the context of health care choice, see for example Beckert and Collyer (2017); Gaynor et al. (2016).
30Distances are measured in a straight line from the centroid or central point of the patient’s Lower Super
Output Area to the post code of the hospital. We include only hospitals that perform at least 20 hip
operations in 2012/13, as hospitals that perform very low volumes may not be in patient choice sets. This
is a particular problem for ISPs where a relatively large fraction of sites perform very few procedures. For
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ISPs in their distance choice sets is 3.9, and 80 per cent of them have between 3 and 5 ISPs.
Since most patients in our data, in fact, choose from the nearest five hospitals, the implicit
assumption underlying our “distance choice set” definition is that they look a bit beyond
when considering their options.
As a robustness check, we consider a variant of this definition of distance choice set. This
alternative definition considers the patient’s 30 closest hospitals, up to a maximal distance
of 30km relative to the centroid of the patient’s LSOA. With this definition, patients in
metropolitan areas with a high hospital density have choice sets with many alternatives and
a relatively small geographic spread, while patients in areas with low hospital density have
choice sets with relatively few alternatives and maximal geographic spread, i.e. up to the
imposed 30km boundary.
The second approach defines Jg(i) as the set of hospital alternatives that the GP referred
patients to over the last three years; we refer to choice sets according to this definition as
“GP choice sets”.31. The approach is motivated by the central importance of GPs in guiding
patients when they exercise choice in the English NHS.32 We assume that this approach
should form a close proxy for the choices offered to patients, as referral to a provider indicates
either pre-existing knowledge or subsequent knowledge obtained following feedback from
patients (Dixon et al., 2010).
The use of prior outpatient referrals should be a reasonable approximation of the alter-
native that may have been considered, and avoids any restrictions on the size of the choice
set from using only hip replacement patients. Again, we restrict to hospitals that conducted
20 or more hip replacements in 2012/13. There is a possibility that this approach falsely
excludes providers that are never chosen, but given the costs of transmitting information
about additional providers to patients, it seems unlikely that GPs would continue to offer
providers that patients never chose. The aim is to proxy for the set of hospitals that the
patient is likely to have discussed with their GP. Estimating the model with these choice
sets means that patient choices can vary across GPs through both the hospital attribute/GP
referral practices interactions included in the “distance choice set” model, and differences in
example, reducing the minimum threshold from 20 to 5 procedures increases the number of relevant ISPs by
22%, but these smaller sites accounted for just 2.7% of ISP patients in 2010/11 and 0.5% of all NHS funded
patients. We include additional Specialist Orthopaedic hospitals within 50km, as these are hospitals that
patient predominately choose when not picking one of their nearest 10. Patients that chose a hospital outside
their nearest 10, plus nearby specialist hospitals, are dropped, which removes 7% of the patient sample.
31To construct these choices, we take all referrals by that GP within Orthopaedics and Trauma over the
period 2009 to 2012 (with an average of 420 referrals), and include hospitals where the GP referred more than
0.5% of patients, plus any sites where any hip replacement patients were referred to in our hip replacement
sample. We exclude patients that were not included in the “distance choice set” sample, to ensure that
model estimates are comparable
32Dixon et al. (2010)
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the sets of hospitals that are presented to patients by GPs. We exclude patients who are not
included in the distance choice set sample, to ensure that paramter estimates are comparable
across model specifications.
The sets of hospitals presented to patients by their GP can be thought of as outcome
of at least three different competing processes: (i) GPs acting as an altruistic agent for the
patient; (ii) costs of acquiring and disseminating information limiting the options that are
presented to patients; and, (iii) incentives of GPs not aligned with those of the patient.
Appendix A discusses each mechanism in more detail and presents estimates from a model
that examines the determinants of the GP’s binary decision whether or not to include the
hospital in the GP choice set33. We find that higher quality hospitals are more likely to be
included in GP choice sets, but the magnitude of the quality effect is small. By contrast,
the inclusion of a hospital in a GP choice set is strongly associated with features of local
health care organisation unrelated to patient health34. And these determinants dominate
the hospital quality effects or population health characteristics.
Figures 2 - 4 compare the composition of distance and GP choice sets. There is large
variation in the number of choices that are offered across GP practices in the “GP choice set”;
also, the majority of GP practices refer to far fewer than the 10 hospitals we consider in the
distance choice set model. Figure 2 shows that the distribution of the number of alternatives
in the GP choice sets is roughly normal. The median number of ISP alternatives is 4 in the
distance choice set but only 1 in the GP choice set.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Tables 5 and 6 show parameter estimates from the mixed logit models based on the distance
and GP choice sets35
33While a formally incorporating the GP level choice set formation process into our model is beyond the
scope of this paper, the paper provides descriptive evidence for the factors that are likely to determine how
the choice set is formed. See Beckert and Collyer (2017), Goeree (2008) and Gaynor et al. (2016) for examples
fo structural modelling of choice set design; Crawford et al. (2016) study demand estimation in the absence
of accurate and quantifiable information on the true choice sets.
34In particular, GPs are much more likely to refer to NHS hospitals within the same PCT. This may reflect
some inertia in referral practices dating back to block contracting in the early 2000s, or a desire to maintain
the revenues of hospitals that provide emergency care for their patients. For ISPs, the hospitals most likely
to be included are the first Wave of ISTCs. The hospitals received a block payment for a fixed number of
procedures, whether or not these procedures were carried out. GPs were therefore encouraged to make sure
these procedure slots were used.
35The tables provide the most important estimates within the context of our substantive discussion. The
remaining parameter estimates are available on request.
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The parameter estimates for the mean valuations of hospital attributes are presented in
Table 5. The parameter estimates from the “distance choice set” model on the left hand
side of the Table provide similar results to existing work on patient choice. Patients have
a preference for shorter travel distances, shorter waiting times and higher quality. We find
that specialist hospitals are more likely to be chosen and ISPs less likely to be chosen. The
random coefficient parameters indicate significant heterogeneity in valuations of distance
and ISPs, but no unobserved variations in the emergency readmission rate. This finding
might be explained by patients deferring to their GP with regard to quality assessments
(Dixon and Robertson, 2009; Monitor, 2015). In an incomplete information setting like the
one considered here, quality is likely assessed via the patients’ GPs who possess superior
information. GPs, in turn, may have relatively homogeneous information on hospital quality
and thus are unlikely to vary significantly in their quality assessments.
The GP choice set model produces a similar pattern of estimates. Responses to quality,
as measured by emergency readmissions and early FT status are slightly smaller (relative to
other attributes such as distance). This might be explained by GP pre-selection eliminating
lower quality hospitals. Specialist hospitals are also valued more highly under the GP choice
set model. This model also identifies patient health, captured by prior emergency admissions,
as characteristic that tends to preclude treatment at specialist hospitals.
Table 6 presents parameter estimates for interactions between hospital type and patient
and GP characteristics. Starting again with the distance choice set parameter estimates,
we find that ethnic minorities and those with underlying ill-health are less likely to seek
treatment at an ISP. The interactions between deprivation and ISP use are positive and
statistically significant at the 10% level for the least deprived half of the the distribution and
negative but not statistically significant for the poorest half. Patients who are registered
with GP practices with high referral concentrations or low prior referral shares to ISPs are
less likely to choose an ISP, which is consistent with an important role played by GPs in the
decision making process.
The results of our robustness check on the underlying distance choice set definition,
using the variant of up to the 30 nearest hospitals within 30km, are reported in Table 7.
The estimates obtained from this alternative choice set definition are closely aligned with
those obtained on the basis of the original distance choice set definition, with the exception
of the magnitude of some of the coefficient estimates on interaction terms and of the ISP
coefficient.36 Qualitatively, the estimates display the same picture as those from the model
36This concerns the magnitude, but not the sign or statistical significance, of the coefficient estimates on
the interaction of the ISP dummy with ethnic minority, deprivation and the GP’s share of prior referrals to
ISPs.
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based on the original distance choice set definition.
Turning now the the parameter estimates of the GP choice set model, they produce
a similar pattern of results with respect to ethnicity and health. In both models, the
magnitude of the interaction between ISP and ethnic minority is approximately equal to
the interaction between ISP and having a previous emergency hospital admission. These
parameters indicate that ISP patients are healthier even accounting for distance and the
hospital choice alternatives that are available, which is unsurprising given the eligibility
criteria for ISPs. Ethnic minorities are less likely to use ISPs, even when controlling for
distance to ISPs, differences in deprivation, or observable measures of health.
The move to the GP choice set model has a greater impact on the parameters of the
interactions between ISP and local area deprivation. The interaction for the least deprived
areas is positive and not statistically significant, whereas whereas the parameter for the
poorest half is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This pattern is similar
to that observed in the raw data, and indicates that lower ISP use by the most deprived is not
fully explained by distance, observable differences in underlying health, or the characteristics
of GPs that treat more deprived patients. GP prior referral characteristics continue to play
a strong role in the GP choice set model, although the relative importance of the prior
concentration of GP referrals is reduced. This is presumably because concentration in part
captures for the number of hospitals in the GP’s choice set.
6 Counterfactual Simulations
6.1 Preliminaries and Underlying Assumptions
In this section, we present results of a series of counterfactual simulations. The simulations
aim at exploring the relative contributions of potentially important drivers of patient choice
that are unrelated to hospital attributes and instead derive from patient characteristics and
guidance that patients receive from their GP. We emphasize that we do not interpret the
results presented here as predictions from policy simulations but rather as stress tests of
the model, in order to assess the relative substantive importance of the respective drivers of
choice.
The main reason why we caution against over-interpreting the level predictions of the
counterfactual simulations is that they are likely to be contaminated by several sources of
potential bias. In general, our maximum likelihood (ML) estimation methodology assesses
goodness of fit in terms of the value of the likelihood function at the ML estimates, not in
terms of a criterion based on prediction errors.
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That aside, discrete choice models like the ones estimated here assign non-zero probability
to every choice alternative in the choice set. In our context, this is relatively unproblematic
as far as NHS hospitals are concerned, but potentially problematic when considering ISPs
because some patients may not be considered eligible for treatment by ISPs, due to health
conditions unobserved by the econometrician. Non-zero predicted choice probabilities for
ISPs induce an upward bias in counterfactual predictions of ISP choice.
Moreover, when predicting ISP choice conditional on a specific patient characteristic, for
example, then the formally correct approach to calculate the predicted conditional choice
probability is to integrate out all other patient characteristics, conditional on the specific
characteristic under consideration. But the multivariate conditional distribution of such
other characteristics is difficult to estimate, even with the rich data we have, and attempts
to estimate it entail risks of bias and non-robustness of their own.
A straightforward way to estimate predicted ISP uptake, conditional on a patient cha-
racteristic, say deprivation, is to sum the predicted choice probabilities conditional on that
characteristic. If deprived patients have relatively bad health and hence their predicted
ISP choice probabilities are relatively low, then in the formally correct approach these
low predicted probabilities would have higher weight in the calculation of expected ISP
choice. Hence, simply summing unweighted predicted ISP choice probabilities will add to the
aforementioned upward bias. Conversely, if wealthy patients are in relatively good health and
hence their predicted ISP choice probabilities are relatively high, then these high predicted
probabilities would have higher weight in the correct approach to calculation of expected ISP
choice, and the sum of unweighted predicted ISP probabilities will tend to underestimate
the expected ISP uptake. Therefore, comparing predicted ISP uptake by sums of predicted
choice probabilities for high and low deprivation patients will tend to underestimate the
discrepancy between these patient groups. Acknowledging this limitation of our approach
to prediction, we accordingly limit our interpretation to the comparison of proportionate
changes in ISP uptake in a number of counterfactual simulations.
Our assumptions for these simulations are as follows. When considering counterfactual
expansions in choice sets, we assume that the costs to the GP of providing wider choice are
minimal, i.e. there is no GP-level capacity constraint. Furthermore, we assume that there is
no capacity constraint at the hospital level, so that additional patients treated at a hospital
under the counterfactual do not change the attributes of that hospital. Given that hospital
attributes such as waiting times may change, the predicted demand shift is an upper bound
of the expected effects.37
37Hospitals that are predicted to face increased patient demand under the counterfactual with given
attributes are likely to increase waiting times if they are capacity comnstrained, which in equilibrium would
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6.2 Simulation Results
We use the model to conduct two sets of simulations to examine factors that might explain
the patterns of sorting we observe by deprivation and ethnicity. The first set sequentially
removes differences between patient groups to ascertain the relative importance of differences
in health, preferences and GP behaviour. The second considers the role of frictions that we
observe affecting the inclusion of sites in GP choice sets.
6.2.1 Mechanisms
Table 8 shows the predicted ISP shares by income quintile and ethnic minority status when
we successively shut down mechanisms that could contribute to the differences in ISP use.
The first two columns show the total number of hip replacements that took place over
the observation horizon and the share of those hip replacements that were performed by
ISPs. The third column gives the predicted shares of ISP patients using our baseline model.
The predicted shares decrease as deprivation increases, but the gradient is less steep than in
the data, for the reasons outlined above. The remaining five columns present results from
simulations where we successively remove potential channels that could generate this sorting.
In step 1, we equalise health across the socio-economic distribution by giving all indivi-
duals the mean health across all four health measures. The aim is to eliminate differences in
ISP use by ethnicity and deprivation that are derived from differences in health. The effect
is to increase the total number of hip replacements at ISPs in all income quintiles. This is
because many individuals will be moved away from having a pre-existing health condition to
a relatively low probability of that condition. The absolute increases are relatively similar
across the income quintiles, but the relative growth is larger for the bottom quintile (22%)
than for the richest three income quintiles (all around 13%). The gradient in ISP use between
richest and poorest patients shrinks from 5.7 percentage points (26.4 % - 20.7 %) to 4.7
percentage points (29.9 % - 25.2 %), This equates to an absolute decrease of 1 percentage
point, which is 17.5% of the original gradient. Step 2 equalises ethnicity, eliminating all
interactions with ethnicity, so that all patients are assumed to behave like those who are
White British. This has minimal effects on the distribution of ISPs by deprivation, as there
are only a small number of ethnic minority patients. In Step 3, we equalise preferences by
eliminating interactions between hospital attributes and deprivation. Again, there is very
little change in the predicted number of ISP patients and the deprivation gradient. This
dampen predicted demand. Conversely, hospitals that are predicted to face diminished demand under the
counterfactual with given attributes are likely to be able to reduce waiting times, which in turn would
enhance predicted demand. Beckert and Schiraldi (2017) provide an equilibrium analysis in which waiting
times respond endogenously to changes in demand.
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implies that given the set of hospitals available, lower ISP use is not attributable to patients
from poorer areas ‘preferring’ to stay with the local NHS hospital.
After removing differences in health and preferences, the remaining differences in ISP
use should be explained by ISP availability. ISPs may be unavailable to patients because (i)
they are not offered the option of choosing an ISP in their local area or (ii) there are no ISPs
within their local area. Simulation step 4 removes all interactions with GP characteristics.
As a consequence, we assume that all choices available will be given equal weight. This
results in a small increase in ISP use for all income quintiles, on the order of 2% for all
income quintiles. The final step replaces the GP choice set with the distance choice set, and
assumes that all patients choose between the 10 closest providers. This has a sizable impact
on the share of patients treated by ISPs in all income quintiles, as the distance choice set
is typically larger than the GP choice set, particularly in terms of ISPs. The gradient in
ISP use between richest and poorest patients shrinks again, to 3.5 percentage points (42.2
% - 38.7 %). As health, ethnicity and GP referrals have been equalised, the only remaining
differences come from differences in the ten nearest hospitals. This remaining 3.5 percentage
points, or 61% of the original difference from the model is therefore attributable to differences
in the geographic distribution of hospitals.
A similar set of results are observed when we consider the same set of simulations by
ethnicity. The model predicts a gap of 9.6 percentage points in ISP use between white
and ethnic minority patients (25 % vs 15.4 %). Step 1, which equalises health, reduces the
difference in ISP use by ethnicity from 9.6 percentage points to 4.2 percentage points, or 56%
of the original difference. Step 2 and 3 are equivalent in this simulation and have almost no
impact on ISP use. Step 4, which removes GP preferences, reduces ISP use by minorities. As
for the income simulations, Step 5 also has a large impact on predicted ISP use. For white
patients, applying the distance choice set increases ISP by 41% compared to 63% for ethnic
minority patients. After step 4, the predicted difference in ISP use remains 4.2 percentage
points or 44 % of the total.
It may be worth noting that any ethnic minority effect is likely to be accentuated by
London. There are very few ISPs in London, but a high share of ethnic minority patients.
In the raw data, the share of ethnic minorities that use ISPs is 7.7 percent when London is
included, and 10.8 percent when London is excluded. 38
Taken together, the simulations reveal three points of note. First, differences in health do
explain a sizable and important portion of the gradient in ISP use by local area deprivation
and ethnicity. Second, patients in poorer areas are presented with a narrower range of
hospitals when making choices, even when taking the local health economy into account.
38The same is not true for deprivation: The share of ISP use with and without London is very similar.
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Third, our simulations show that even removing differences in health, preferences, and the
choice of providers offered, ethnic minority patients and those living in more deprived areas
are less likely to choose an ISP. This can only be attributed to the geographical location of
ISPs. Conditional on hospital placement, this response from patients may well be efficient.
The question in policy terms, is whether such a geographic distribution of service provision
is desirable.
6.2.2 Market Imperfections
Interpreting the role of GPs is difficult because GPs fulfil a dual role, as advocates for their
patients on the one hand and as gatekeepers for the NHS on the other. Any observed
differences in referrals across practices could therefore reflect differences in the needs of
patients, which may not be observable to the econometrician, GP’s responding to incentives
or pressures unrelated to patient need, or information imperfections.
In this section we therefore focus on two important market features that are potentially
related to the incentives that GPs face when referring patients and that are unrelated to
patient health: the type of ISP contract and the role of administrative boundaries.
Table 9 shows the share of patients from each provider type by local area deprivation
quintile observed in the data. The first column shows the distribution for NHS hospitals.
Patients in the richest 3 quintiles are over-represented, and those in the poorest two quintiles
are under-represented. This is because we define deprivation based on the whole of England
rather than the sample, and patients living in richer areas are more likely to have hip
replacements. The higher rate of hip replacements in poorer areas in part reflects the age
structure of the poorest parts of the country, although there is evidence that these areas
are also under-served relative to need (Judge et al., 2010). The second column shows the
distribution for private hospitals (not ISTCs). As expected, private hospital patients are
most likely to be in the richest two quintiles of the country. Only 7.3% of private hospital
patients lived in the poorest quintile of areas, relative to 13.7% of NHS hospital patients.
This is unsurprising, as private hospitals are typically located in richer areas. However,
Wave 1 ISTCs, which were centrally planned and initially had block contracts, show a
similar pattern, treating only 5.5% of patients in the most deprived quintile of areas. Wave
2 ISTCs, which were also centrally planned but without guaranteed volume contracts, have
a distribution which is closest to NHS providers, but only treat 1,462 patients, so the impact
on the overall ISP gradient is relatively minor.
To understand the relative roles of ISTCs and private hospitals in generating the observed
gradient in ISP use, we simulate the predicted probability of treatment by an ISTC when all
private hospitals are eliminated. We then examine how the gradient in use at ISTCs changes.
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This is important, because the establishment of ISTCs involved negotiations between the
NHS and the private health care providers about the locations in which these contracts
would be issued, with need being a key determinant. By contrast, by 2012/13, almost all
private hospitals had entered the market, with location determined purely on the locations
of pre-existing private hospitals.
Of the 11,000 private hospital patients to be redistributed, slightly more than 1,700 are
predicted to attend an ISTC, with the rest redistributed to NHS hospitals. However, the
redistribution of these patients to ISTCs does not change the overall deprivation gradient.
This shows that the gradient is not the result of allowing pre-existing private hospitals to
enter the market for NHS funded care in terms of the relative shares treated in the richest
and poorest quintiles. However, because among NHS-funded patients treated by ISPs in
2012/13 private hospitals treated the majority of patients, access to private hospitals does
increase the absolute difference between the numbers treated by ISPs in the richest and the
poorest quintile. This also suggests the incentives to refer to wave 1 ISTCs are not what is
generating the local area deprivation gradient.
The determinants of the GP choice in Appendix A1 indicate that administrative bounda-
ries have an important role in determining whether a hospital is included in a GP choice set.
In particular, hospitals are more likely to be included if they are located in the same PCT as
the GP practice. To examine the impact of these boundaries on ISP use, we take a sample
of GP practices that are within 1500 metres of each other but lie on opposite sides of the
PCT boundary. The median absolute difference in predicted ISP share between practices
on either side of PCT boundaries is 3.7 percentage points within PCT, but 5.6 percentage
points between PCTs. However, on the 75th and 90th percentile, the predicted ISP shares
between PCT practices are closer together. This suggests that the impact of administrative
boundaries on ISP shares is relatively small. This is what would be expected in a system in
which payment is on a prospective basis.
6.3 The costs of sorting
Our parameter estimates and simulations illustrate that differences in underlying health are
important sources of sorting. This may represent an efficient allocation of resources as ISPs
do not have the specialist facilities needed to appropriately treat those with complex needs.
However, the payments the NHS makes to providers have only very limited gradations in
payments to take account of differences in patient health that affect the costs of treatments
patients receive.
Table 10 shows the main NHS tariffs or payments that are applied to hip replacement
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patients in our sample. These tariffs are set to reflect the average cost of providing a
particular bundle of care. The first and second column show the number of patients in
each HRG category and the associated tariff. Three quarters of the sample fall into a
single category (Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category 1 without Complications
or Comorbidities HB12C), which had a price of £5,832 in 2013/13 (NHS England, 2013).
Only around 10% fall into HRGs for those with complications and comorbidities, which are
associated with higher tariffs.
The fourth column of Table 10 shows the share of patients within each tariff that are
treated by ISPs. ISPs treat 22% of patients in the “simple” HRG, but only 9.1% of those
within the tariff for those with “complications and comorbidities” and 7.6% within the
tariff for those with “major complications and comorbidities”. This sorting across tariffs is
compatible with the goals of the ISP reforms, as competition even within a segment of the
market may be sufficient to generate pressure to improve quality for all. The distribution
is also consistent with improving patient welfare, as NHS hospitals are likely to be better
equipped to deal with patients with worse underlying health. NHS hospitals may see a higher
share of complicated patients, but they are compensated for the associated costs by higher
tariff payments.
In this section we consider the implications for NHS hospitals and for competition when
sorting occurs within HRGs. The third column of Table 10 shows the share of patients with
previous emergency admissions to hospitals. There are two points to note here. The first
is that, as might be expected, the share of patients with previous emergency admissions for
the “simple” tariff is approximately half (0.17) that of patients for tariffs with some and
major complications (0.345 and 0.34 respectively). Second, although the share of patients
with previous admissions is lower for those in the “simple” HRG, there is a considerable
share that do have underlying health conditions. In additional to the 17% who have had
a previous emergency admission, 53% have had a previous elective admission, 27% have a
non-zero Charlson Index, and 10% are over 80. This suggests that the true costs to hospitals
of treating patients within the same HRG are likely to vary. Any sorting according to
underlying health and the associated costs would not be reflected in tariff payments. In
particular, if healthier patients choose ISPs, the payments received by NHS hospitals and
ISPs will be the same, but the average cost per patient treated by an NHS hospital will rise.
This limits the ability of NHS hospitals to cross-subsidise across patients.
Our data do not allow us to calculate the precise cost to the hospital of treating a parti-
cular patient. We therefore adopt a simplified approach where we assume that differences in
cost are proxied for by length of stay. Estimates of costs per bed day vary, but we use the
per day long stay payment in 2012/13 of £231 per day (NHS England, 2013).
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Restricting our attention to just those patients who have a “simple” HRG (HB12C), the
data show that patients treated by NHS hospitals have a mean stay of 4.5 days, compared
to 3.7 days for patient treated by ISPs. This shorter length of stay for ISP patients may be
explained by two factors. First, ISPs may deliver care faster and discharge patients earlier.
Second, patients treated by ISPs may be healthier and less costly to treat.
To establish the importance of this second channel, we run a linear model where length
of stay for patients treated by NHS hospitals is estimated as a function of a quadratic in
age, of sex, previous admissions and Charlson index, ethnic minority status and local area
deprivation. We then use this model to predict the length of stay for all patients. For
ISP patients, we therefore generate the expected length of stay had they chosen an NHS
hospital. The distribution of predicted lengths of stay by provider type is presented in
Figure 7. The distribution is more concentrated for ISP patients, with a higher proportion
with short expected lengths of stay (up to 5 days) and a lower proportion having expected
lengths of stay of 6 days or more. The mean is 4.44 for NHS patients and 4.26 for patients
treated by ISPs. This shows that the majority of the differences in the raw data are driven
by ISPs discharging patients sooner, but that patients treated by ISPs are also slightly less
complex 39.
Using these estimates we conduct a counterfactual calculation where the 10,728 ISP
patients replace a random sample of the same number of patient treated in an NHS hospital.
To do this we use the sum of the predicted lengths of stay across all ISP patients, giving a
total number of bed days of 45,653 days. We then draw a random sample of 10,728 patients
from NHS hospitals from within the same HRG, and again calculate the predicted number
of bed days. For the sample we draw, this is equal to 47,499 patient days. Subtracting one
from the other gives the total number of days saved by NHS hospitals if ISP patients had
been treated by NHS hospitals, which is equal to 1,846 patient days across the NHS or 14
days per year per NHS Acute Trust. Applying the cost per bed day of £231, this gives a
total cost of £426,426 ($625,000). This is equivalent of to the cost of an additional 77 hip
replacements or 0.1% of the total number of hip replacements that tool place in 2012/13.
In summary, these calculations suggest that the limited gradation in HRG payments
means that NHS hospitals and ISPs receive the same payment for treating “simple” patients,
but that ISPs face lower patient contingent per treatment costs. This would imply that ISPs
have higher profit margins, which are not due to ISPs being intrinsically more efficient, and
that as a consequence of sorting ISPs receive an implicit subsidy from the taxpayer. Any
patient sorting that is correlated with treatment costs will have similar implications in all
39We check the robustness of this result by also running a model that includes the comorbidities recorded
in PROMS data, which are not present in HES. The results do not change
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DRG systems. These costs must be taken into account when regulating healthcare markets
or designing policy, and must be weighed against the advantages of a limited number of DRG
codes.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we examine mechanisms of patient sorting between private and public providers
of publicly funded elective medical treatments in the English National Health Service, using
elective hip replacements as the example procedure. There are at least three reasons why
differential sorting may be of concern. First, inequality in access to, and uptake of, private
provision is potentially important for welfare, especially when private providers are able to
deliver care much faster than public providers, and where patient satisfaction and quality
are arguably superior (NHS Partners Network (2015), Care Quality Commission (2012),
Browne et al. (2008)). Second, policies to expand market access to private providers are
often introduced to generate competitive pressure on public incumbents, with the aim of
improving efficiency, quality and innovation. Unequal access implies the threat of patients
switching provider is below its full potential, and hence public providers may be expected
to experience less competitive pressure than intended by the policy reform. Finally, in
a system of national prices that do not necessarily fully compensate for differences in the
severity of patient illness, different patient types with different costs entail profit implications
for providers, and these matter acutely when budgets and capacity are constrained.
We find that those patients who live in more deprived areas and those from ethnic
minorities are less likely to choose private providers. Our model estimates and simulations
show that the most important mechanisms in driving these differences are underlying health,
which affects eligibility for treatment by a private provider, and the geographic distribution
of providers. However, the restrictions that GPs place on the choices that they offer their
patients also have a substantive role to play. The dual role of the GP as both an agent for
the patient and a gatekeeper for NHS services makes these relationships harder to interpret.
On the one hand, in a market where patients have imperfect information and find it difficult
to assess quality, let alone to act on it (Dixon et al., 2010), GP pre-selection and mandated
advice improve welfare. On the other hand, given the budgetary implications that GPs’
referral decisions have, their incentives may not be perfectly aligned with those of their
patients, and this may bias their advice and thereby reduce welfare (Beckert and Collyer,
2017).
Our findings have several important implications for policy, both within the English
NHS and in other country and policy settings. First, eligibility criteria and the geographic
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distribution of providers have important implications for how consumers sort across provi-
ders. In our context, we show how health criteria and the opening up of pre-existing private
hospitals to public patients led to ISPs treating a higher share of rich and white patients.
However, the same mechanisms apply in other contexts. In the UK, a close paralell is the
sorting of more advantaged pupils into selective secondary education or grammar schools
40. This type of sorting is not necessarily inefficient when the set of providers and eligibility
criteria is taken as given, but may still be of concern to policy makers. In terms of equity,
we show that certain groups of patients have less access to ISP providers, which offer lower
waiting times than NHS hospitals. This may be regarded as undesirable by politicians or the
public. In terms of payments and public finances, our results illustrate that when payments
to hospitals are largely fixed, the sorting of healthier patients to ISPs led to an increase
in cost for NHS hospitals and limited their ability to cross-subsidise across patients. Such
concerns are particularly relevant at present, when post Great Recession austerity means
that budgets for the NHS and other public services are particularly tight.
Second, if choice is to be the driving force behind competition and a drive to improve
quality, more work is needed to understand information imperfections and other frictions
that may limit choice for all, and for some groups in particular. Our results show that
referral patterns of GPs are strongly correlated with subsequent patient choices. However,
whether this reflects GPs acting as a perfect agent for the patient, information imperfections,
or alternative incentives unrelated to patient health is less clear. We show that the choice sets
presented to patients are a function of attributes of hospitals that are unrelated to patient
need. Yet the degree of sorting as the result of frictions, at least into provider type, is
minor relative to the importance of patient characteristics and the geographical distribution
of providers.
Finally, our results support existing work that highlights ethnic disparities in health care
access (Cookson et al., 2016; Dixon et al., 2010; Fiscella et al., 2000). We find that ethnic
minority patients are less likely to use an ISP than a patient who both lives in the most
deprived fifth of areas and has poor underlying health. While part of this disparity by
ethnicity is accounted for by differences in health and the location of ISPs, a large fraction
is unexplained. There may be some differences in health that are unobserved. However,
surveys of GPs and studies of differential take up of screening suggest that there are likely to
be further barriers (Fisher et al., 2014; Moser et al., 2009). As in many other public services,
reducing ethnic disparities will require identifying these barriers and developing strategies
to overcome them.
40These schools are disproportionately located in richer than average areas, and students meeting the test
score eligibility criteria are from more advantaged background.
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Figure 2: The distribution of the number alternatives in patient choice sets
Notes Sample is restricted to those hospitals that are recorded as conducting at least 20
NHS-funded elective hip replacements in the NHS Hospital Episode Statistics in the given
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Figure 3: The distribution of the number NHS alternatives in patient choice sets
Notes Sample is restricted to those NHS hospitals that are recorded as conducting at least
20 NHS-funded elective hip replacements in the NHS Hospital Episode Statistics in the given
Figure 4: The distribution of the number ISP alternatives in patient choice sets
Notes Sample is restricted to those Independent Sector Providers that are recorded as
conducting at least 20 NHS-funded elective hip replacements in the NHS Hospital Episode
Statistics in the given
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Figure 5: Distribution of Patient Choices, Hospitals Ordered by Distance
Notes: Distances are calculated in a straight line between the centroid of the patient’s local
area (LSOA) and the postcode of the hospital. The grey bars exclude patients that chose
treatment at ISPs.
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Figure 6: Share of Patients with Underlying Health Problems by Local Area
Deprivation Quintiles.)
Notes: Quintile 1 corresponds the least deprived fifth of areas on the basis of IMD. Quintile
5 corresponds the most deprived quintile of areas. Local area deprivation measures by Index
of Multiple Deprivation rank of the patient’s lower super output area
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Figure 7: The Distribution of Predicted Length of Stay for Hip Replacement
Patients, by Provider Type
Notes: Kernel density function
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Table 1: ISP Types
Wave 1 Wave 2
Wave 1 ISTC Wave 2 ISTC AQP
Year commenced 2003 2006 2006
Year last contract ended 2011 2015 -
Payment Contracted procedure num-
bers, full payment guaran-
teed
Payments for fixed costs
guaranteed, per procedure
thereafter.
Per procedure
Patients NHS patients only NHS patients only NHS patients and private
pay patients
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Table 2: Means of Hospital Attributes, by Provider Type
NHS ISP All
Attributes with RC
30 Day Em Readmit Ratio (2012) 0.91 1.09 1.02
(1=expected) (0.42) (0.64) (0.53)
Attributes without RC
Median Waiting Time ) 87 45.3 71.2
(days, 2012/13 (23.3) (33.2) (34.1)
Share Early Found Trusts 0.160 N/A 0.10
(0.37) N/A (0.30)
Share Specialist Hosps 0.0205 0.008 0.016
(0.142) (0.091) (0.125)
Patients 253.3 103.4 196.5
(174.0) (96.0) (166.0)
Hospitals 195 119 314
Notes: The sample includes hospitals that treated at least 20 patients in 2012/13. Waiting times are
measured from the date of the decision to admit for a procedure and the date of the admission for the
procedure. The 30 day emergency admission rate is given by predicting readmissions based on a regression
of readmissions on the age, sex and underlying health of patients and dividing the actual readmissions, by
the expected number. An ISP is defined as a hospital site that has a code in HES that begins with an ”N”.
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Table 3: Mean patient characteristics by chosen provider type
ISP NHS Difference
Age 68.2 68.6 -0.4***
(10.0) (11.6) (0.1)
Ethnic Minority 0.013 0.039 -0.025***
(0.115) (0.193) (0.002)
Female 0.598 0.601 -0.002
(0.49) (0.49) (0.005)
Local Area Deprivation 0.391 0.45 -0.058***
(Scaled 0-1) (0.253) (0.275) (0.003)
Moderate Comorbidity 0.167 0.225 -0.058***
(CI=1) (0.373) (0.418) (0.004)
Severe Comorbidity 0.044 0.096 -0.052***
(CI>1) (0.205) (0.295) (0.003)
Prev Emergency Admission 0.132 0.230 -0.098***
(0.338) (0.421) (0.004)
Prev Elective Admission 0.481 0.568 -0.088***
(0.500) (0.495) (0.005)
GP ref HHI (2011) 0.548 0.607 -0.059***
(0.178) (0.197) (0.002)
GP 3 year ISP ref share 0.13 0.077 0.054***
(2009/10-2011/12) (0.106) (0.086) (0.001)
N 12,357 50,525
Notes: Local area deprivation is measured using the (inverse) rank of the
patient’s Lower Super Output Area’s Index of Multiple Deprivation in 2001.
This measure is then rescaled to fall between zero and one. Ethnic minority
are those not classed as White British or Irish. Comorbidities measured using
the Charlson Index calculated using the information in the hip replacement
admission. Previous admissions in the previous 3 years (1095 days) for any
cause. Sample includes patients that had an elective hip replacement in
2012/13 and were treated by a hospital that treated at least 19 other patients
and that was in the closest 10 providers from the centroid of the patient’s
LSOA or a specialist hospital within 50km.
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Table 7: Mixed Logit Results: Alternative Choice Set Definition
Coeff SE p-value
Attributes with RC
Distance
Mean -0.137 0.011 0.000
SD 0.133 0.003 0.000
ISP
Mean -2.981 0.265 0.000
SD 3.745 0.127 0.000
Emergency Readmissions
Mean -0.911 0.142 0.000
SD -0.019 0.062 0.377
Attributes w/out RC
Early Foundation Trust 0.849 0.167 0.000
Waiting times (weeks) -0.119 0.016 0.000
Specialist Orthopedic Hosp 2.000 0.232 0.000
ISPs
ISP x Age -0.003 0.003 0.142
ISP x Ethnic Minority -1.904 0.222 0.000
ISP x Deprivation (richest) 0.364 0.418 0.802
ISP x Deprivation (poorest half) -0.9292 0.4351 0.016
ISP x Prev Em Admit -1.336 0.088 0.000
ISP x Prev El Admit -0.610 0.064 0.000
ISP x CI of 1 -0.864 0.081 0.000
ISP x CI of 2+ -1.698 0.133 0.000
ISP x GP HHI -0.836 0.182 0.000
ISP x GP refs to ISPs 7.621 0.478 0.000
Spec Hosp x Ethnic Minority 0.220 0.139 0.057
Spec Hosp x Deprivation (richest) 0.230 0.415 0.290
Spec Hosp x Deprivation (poorest half) 0.190 0.418 0.325
Spec Hosp x Pre Em Admit -0.056 0.061 0.179
Notes: Choice set definition - up to the 30 nearest hospitals within 30km relative to the
centroid of the patient’s LSOA. The sample includes all patients who had an elective
hip replacement in financial year 2012/13. Random coefficients are estimated at the
patient level.
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Table 9: Percentage of Patients in each deprivation quintile, by NHS hospital and
ISP type
NHS Hospital ISP
Deprivation quintile Private Hospital Phase 1 ISTC Phase 2 ISTC
1 (richest) 23.15 28.55 26.87 26.95
2 23.69 27.19 30.55 23.6
3 21.75 22.21 23.31 22.78
4 17.72 14.75 13.79 14.57
5 (poorest) 13.7 7.3 5.49 12.11
% of patients 100 100 100 100
Patients 50709 9220 1712 1462
Sample includes hip replacement patients that choose a hospital within their closest 10 providers conducting more
than 50 hip replacements. Deprivation quintile given by the Index of Multiple Deprivaion (IMD) rank of the
patient’s LSOA.
Table 10: Percentage of Patients in each deprivation quintile, by NHS hospital
and ISP type
HRG Groups Total Patients Tariff, £($) Share prev em admits Share ISP
HB12C: Major Hip Procedures for non
Trauma Category 1 without CC
47,280 5,382 (6,728) 0.170 0.222
HB12A: Major Hip Procedures for non
Trauma Category 1 with Major CC
3,100 8,305 (10,381) 0.345 0.072
HB12B: Major Hip Procedures for non
Trauma Category 1 with CC
3,187 6,021 (7,526) 0.340 0.091
HB11C: Major Hip Procedures for non
Trauma Category 2 without CC
1,491 6,579 (8,224) 0.370 0.190
Other 7,654 - 0.324 0.089
Total 62,712 0.211 0.191
Source: NHS England 2012-13 tariff information spreadsheet
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A GP Choice Set Determinants
There are at least three potential mechanisms that may mean that patients are not presented
with all the hospitals present in the standard distance choice set.
First, GPs may act as a patient surrogate, i.e. as an altruistic agent who presents patients
only with the highest ranked alternatives. A GP might therefore exclude hospitals that are
far away and of low quality. In a full information setting, in principle the GP could choose
on behalf of the patient, and a mandate to offer choice would be unnecessary.
Second, information on providers is often costly to acquire and to disseminate. The costs
of information acquisition mean that the patient is likely to defer to the GP in terms of
choice alternatives to consider, but also imply that GPs may not acquire knowledge about
all providers. This is supported by results from GP surveys which indicate that GPs rely
on “soft” knowledge from previous experience and referrals, rather than comparing clinical
indicators (Dixon et al., 2010). Incomplete information on the part of the GP may be
particularly relevant for the inclusion of ISPs, as the providers are new and GPs will have
less information based on previous referrals. The cost of communicating and disseminating
information about choice options to patients is costly both to GPs themselves and for
patients, where large choice sets may complicate the choice problem (see, for example,
Kamenica (2008) on the tyranny of choice and choice overload). As a result, GPs may
limit the number of hospital alternatives they present to patients to a small number, either
because (i) GPs do not have an incentive to acquire information about further hospitals or
(ii) some hospitals that the GP does have information about are withheld 41. The resulting
narrow choice set may exclude hospital alternatives that patients would rank highly if they
had perfect information. This pre-selection is potentially efficient, conditional the costs of
information acquisition and dissemination, because it saves patients the cost of collecting
the necessary information themselves. The question is then whether there is a way of
reducing these information costs to overcome the market friction. Efficiency also hinges
on the incentives of GP and patient being aligned.
Finally, if GPs face incentives that are not aligned with those of the patient, then such
pre-selection on the part of the GP may be distortive. It comprises situations in which
GPs are uninformed about, or unresponsive to, evaluation criteria relevant to patients; and
situations in which GPs face idiosyncratic incentives that patients are unaware of. For
41These assumptions are consistent with evidence (Dixon et al., 2010; Monitor, 2015) that, the choice
mandate notwithstanding, the majority of patients gets to discuss no more than five options with the GP
and that GPs feel that they operate under resource constraints that do not permit them to discuss more
options while seeing the same number of patients. Such resource constraints suggest that GPs decide on a
relatively tightly delineated, standardized set of alternatives that they discuss with their patients
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example, the contracts granted to Wave 1 ISTCs, which compensate providers for a fixed
number of procedures, irrespective of whether those procedures were conducted, provided
GPs with an incentive to refer to those providers; patients would not know or care about
the underlying financial arrangements.
A.1 Determinant of inclusion in GP choice sets
The GP choice sets used to estimate the GP choice set model are determined by referral
patterns over the previous three years (2009/10 - 2011/12). We include hospitals where GP
practices referred more than 0.5% of patients. The mean number of referrals was 420 per
GP practice. We then add any hospital that a GP referred a hip replacement patient to in
that year, if these are no already included in the sample.
This section estimates a logit model for whether each of the 313 hospitals that conducted
at least 20 procedures were included in GP choice set. Results are presented in Table
A1. Column 1 shows the odds that an NHS hospital is in a GP choice set given the
characteristics of the hospital. As expected, the odds of inclusion decline with distance,
increase in hospital quality and decline in waiting times. This fits with the model of GPs
acting as altruistic agents for their patients. However, the role of quality is relatively weak.
This is consistent with responses to a survey of Providers in 2008 and 2009, where it was
perceived that GP referral patterns paid little attention to quality (Dixon et al., 2010).
Specialist Orthopedic hospitals are 54 times more likely to be included in GP choice sets,
holding other characteristics constant, and hospitals located in the same Primary Care Trust
(PCT) are 10 times more likely to be included. NHS acute hospitals are separate from PCTs,
however this within PCT effect may be explained by differences in information on GPs
wishing to ensure that hospitals where their patients receive emergency treatment continue
to receive a stream of funding.
Coumn 2 of Table A1 shows the factors that determine whether an ISP is included in a GP
choice set are similar to those for an NHS hospital. Factors of importance to patients, such as
distance, waiting times, and clinical quality do affect referrals, although the effect of quality
is relatively small. The type of ISP is a very strong determinant. The odds of including an
ISP are 6.4 times higher for Wave 1 ISTCs and 3.3 times higher for Wave 2 ISTCs, relative to
hospitals that also treat private patients. As all ISPs place similar restrictions on the types
of patients that are eligible for ISP treatment, this must operate either through differences
in information on incentives to refer. In particular, Wave 1 ISTCs received payments for
contracted procedures whether or not undertaken. Primary Care Trusts therefore had an
incentive to ask GPs to refer. In common with NHS hospitals, ISPs are more likely to be
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included in choice sets if they are located in the same PCT, although the magnitude of this
difference is lower (with odds 3 times higher). There are no clear incentives for GPs or
Primary Care Trusts for favouring ISPs within the same PCT, suggesting that this is likely
to reflect imperfect information rather than incentives.
Columns 3 and 4 add the characteristics of the local area including the share of the
MSOA population that is non white, the share over 75 and local area deprivation. These
coefficients capture whether these characteristics affect the average number of alternatives of
each provider type that are included. Local area deprivation does not have an impact on the
size of the choice set for either NHS or ISP hospitals. The probability of an alternative being
included, conditional on hospital characteristics, is increasing in the share of the population
over 75 and decreasing in population density. For both types of provider, the probability
any given provider is included is decreasing in the non-white share of the population. The
magnitude of this effect is larger for ISPs than for NHS hospitals. This is consistent with
results of the Dixon et al. (2010) survey, where GPs noted that language difficulties may
limit the extent to which ethnic minority patients can participate in choice.
Columns 5 and 6 include characteristics of nearest NHS Trust and the local health
economy. This is because the incentives of GPs and patients to invest in learning about
new providers is likely to depend on the quality and quantity of NHS hospitals in the local
area. For both NHS and ISP providers, the probability that a hospital is included in a GP’s
choice set is decreasing in the number of NHS hospitals within 15km. This effect is greater
for ISPs than NHS hospitals. For both types of providers, the odds of choice set inclusion
is increasing in the waiting times of the nearest NHS hospital and lower in areas where the
nearest NHS hospital is of higher quality (as measured by early Foundation Trust status).
Finally, columns 7 and 8 include characteristics of the GP practice. For both types of
provider, the odds that a hospital is included in the choice set is increasing in the practice
list size. This effect is stronger for ISPs than NHS hospitals. Part of this effect is likely
to come from the higher number of overall referrals and therefore the greater chance that
we will observe a referral in the data. For NHS hospitals, the odds of inclusion does not
depend on GP practice size. However, GP practices with more than 2 GPs are more likely to
include any given ISP in their choice set than single GP practices. For both provider types,
GP practices with a higher fraction of GPs from outside the EEA and a higher fraction of
GPs under 40 are less likely to refer to any given provider. This is consistent with these
types of GPs having less knowledge and experience of the local health economy, and being
less efficient in acquiring information. However, it should also be noted that there may be
unobservable characteristics of practice lists that are correlated the GP characteristics.
Taken together, the estimates in Table A1 are consistent with GP’s acting as altruistic
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agents for their patients. In particular, whether a hospital is included in a GP’s choice set
depends on hospital characteristics and the composition of the practice list. There is also
strong evidence that whether a hospital, and particularly, an ISP is included in the choice set
depends on the existing health economy. This may be efficient given the costs of acquiring
information and providing choices to patients. However, it is also important to note that
whether a hospital is included is also influenced by factors other than patient health, in
particular whether the hospital is in the same PCT and the particular type of ISP contract.
This illustrates that GP’s do respond to incentives or pressures.
A.2 GP Level Random Coefficients
The estimated models using the distance and GP choice set definitions have both assumed
that random coefficients operate at the patient level. Given the likely role of the GP in
forming choice sets and offering advice, it is possible that unobserved variation in preferences
is not attributable to the patient, but instead to the GP. We therefore re-estimate the GP
choice set model with random coefficients at the GP level. For computational reasons we do
so by drawing a random sample of 1000 GP practices and include all their hip replacement
patients in the estimation. The model amounts to re-interpreting the choice outcomes as
those that a GP might arrive at when deciding on behalf of each of the GP’s. This acts
as a robustness test to our preferred GP choice set specification, to ensure that our main
results are not driven by the relative importance of GPs and patients in the decision-making
process.
Parameter estimates from the GP level model are presented in Table A2. In terms of
valuations of hospital attribute, introducing GP-level random coefficients has the greatest
impact on the mean and standard deviation parameters for an ISP provider and emergency
readmissions. The negative parameter estimate for ISP use is smaller in absolute value than
for the patient level model, in absolute terms and relative to the distance parameter. Ho-
wever, the smaller sample size means that the mean valuation is not statistically significant.
The extent of the unobserved variation is also smaller and remains statistically significant.
This suggests that GPs experience less heterogeneity in valuations of ISPs. For emergency
readmissions, the estimated parameter remains negative, but as with the ISP indicator, is
not statistically significant. However, the random coefficient goes from very small and not
statistically significant in the patient level models to sizeable and statistically significant
when random coefficients are estimated at the GP level. Estimates of the remaining coef-
ficients, notably on the various interactions, are broadly similar to those of our preferred
specifications but typically closer to zero.
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Differences between the patient-level and GP-level models are relatively small. However,
interpreting those differences is not straightforward. The GP model can be viewed as a
version of a choice model that blends the patient’s and GP’s contributions to the choice
outcome. Take for example, the estimated random coefficient for 30 day readmissions, where
the two models differ most. The statistically significant random coefficient in the GP-level
model could arise from the GP observing patient characteristics that the econometrician
does not observe and that lead the GP to choose a hospital for the patient that excels along
other dimensions relative to quality.
We include the results from this model because they demonstrate the robustness of our
headline results to modelling assumptions. We caution, however, against attempts to directly
interpret the results from this model.
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Table A1: The odds that a hospital is included in a GP choice set
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hosp chars + loc area +GP practice + local healthcare
NHS ISP NHS ISP NHS ISP NHS ISP
Log Distance 0.0529*** 0.0489*** 0.0499*** 0.0332*** 0.0398*** 0.0236*** 0.0397*** 0.0231***
(0.00108) (0.00135) (0.00108) (0.00114) (0.000957) (0.000919) (0.000954) (0.000904)
Waiting Times 2012 0.999** 1.003*** 0.999* 0.994*** 1.000 0.992*** 1.000 0.992***
(0.000363) (0.000539) (0.000361) (0.000708) (0.000360) (0.000752) (0.000360) (0.000751)
Same PCT 10.03*** 3.374*** 8.755*** 3.292*** 6.901*** 2.563*** 6.880*** 2.587***
(0.445) (0.167) (0.382) (0.170) (0.283) (0.127) (0.282) (0.129)
ISP type (relative to private hospitals)
Phase 1 ISTC 6.397*** 7.583*** 8.061*** 8.149***
(0.301) (0.402) (0.438) (0.444)
Phase 2 ISTC 3.347*** 3.212*** 3.033*** 3.079***
(0.183) (0.211) (0.210) (0.215)
Early Foundation Trust 0.993 0.990 1.006 1.006
(0.0265) (0.0263) (0.0269) (0.0269)
Readmission Ratio 0.749*** 0.911*** 0.748*** 1.011 0.755*** 0.971 0.755*** 0.968
(0.0160) (0.0205) (0.0159) (0.0315) (0.0162) (0.0331) (0.0162) (0.0330)
Specialist Orthopedic Hospital 53.69*** 56.46*** 183.9*** 65.86*** 297.5*** 66.04*** 310.8***
(1.720) (1.875) (14.63) (2.333) (25.85) (2.344) (27.02)
Local Area Deprivation 0.940 1.081 1.013 1.085 1.039 1.190**
(0.0534) (0.0946) (0.0538) (0.0928) (0.0552) (0.102)
% pop non white 0.548*** 0.159*** 0.765*** 0.242*** 0.771*** 0.249***
(0.0513) (0.0357) (0.0650) (0.0463) (0.0657) (0.0477)
% pop over 75 1.031*** 1.092*** 1.026*** 1.089*** 1.025*** 1.090***
(0.0103) (0.0161) (0.00935) (0.0143) (0.00933) (0.0131)
Population Density 0.993*** 0.987*** 0.995*** 0.994*** 0.995*** 0.993***
(0.000633) (0.00139) (0.000606) (0.00126) (0.000611) (0.00126)
No of Trusts ¡15km (relative to 0)
1 0.555*** 0.404*** 0.556*** 0.406***
(0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0209) (0.0215)
2 0.287*** 0.171*** 0.290*** 0.176***
(0.0126) (0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0118)
3 0.212*** 0.116*** 0.216*** 0.125***
(0.0108) (0.00979) (0.0111) (0.0105)
4 0.169*** 0.112*** 0.173*** 0.122***
(0.0104) (0.0117) (0.0107) (0.0128)
5+ 0.136*** 0.0689*** 0.139*** 0.0742***
(0.00830) (0.00741) (0.00843) (0.00801)
Nearest Trust Characteristics
Waiting Times 2012 1.000 1.002*** 1.000 1.002***
(0.000190) (0.000374) (0.000190) (0.000370)
Early Foundation Trust 0.766*** 0.733*** 0.770*** 0.740***
(0.0250) (0.0363) (0.0250) (0.0358)
GP Practice characteristics
Practice list size (’000s) 1.016*** 1.045***
(0.00490) (0.00739)
Number of GPs in the practice (relative to
0)
2-3 0.982 1.259***
(0.0446) (0.105)
4-6 0.906* 1.313***
(0.0484) (0.124)
7+ 0.945 1.226*
(0.0643) (0.142)
% GPs non EEA 0.909** 0.874*
(0.0358) (0.0616)
% GPs under 40 0.855*** 0.811**
(0.0470) (0.0720)
Observations 1,356,285 713,463 1,356,285 713,463 1,356,285 713,463 1,356,285 713,463
Pseudo R2 0.617 0.650 0.621 0.699 0.633 0.717 0.634 0.719
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Observations are at the GP-hospital level. The dependent variable takes the value
1 if the hospital is in the GP’s choice set. Estimates are odds ratios. Standard errors are clustered at the GP level and are robust to the presence of
heteroskedasticity. All specifications include government office region fixed effects.
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Table A2: Mixed Logit Results: GP Practice level random coefficients
Coeff SE p-value
Attributes with RC
Distance
Mean -0.101 0.017 0.000
SD 0.083 0.005 0.000
ISP
Mean -0.832 0.591 0.149
SD 1.076 0.088 0.000
Emergency Readmissions
Mean -0.415 0.449 0.000
SD 1.547 0.091 0.000
Attributes w/out RC
Early Foundation Trust -0.219 0.378 0.563
Waiting times (weeks) -0.066 0.039 0.085
Specialist Orthopedic Hosp 2.620 0.446 0.000
ISPs
ISP x Age 0.009 0.004 0.033
ISP x Ethnic Minority -0.441 0.296 0.137
ISP x Deprivation (richest) -0.368 0.401 0.359
ISP x Deprivation (poorest half) -0.251 0.203 0.215
ISP x Prev Em Admit -0.714 0.115 0.000
ISP x Prev El Admit -0.169 0.088 0.0427
ISP x CI of 1 -0.364 0.110 0.000
ISP x CI of 2+ -1.070 0.182 0.000
ISP x GP HHI -0.486 0.505 0.337
ISP x GP refs to ISPs 0.471 1.927 0.807
Spec Hosp x Ethnic Minority 0.370 0.305 0.225
Spec Hosp x Deprivation (richest) 0.653 0.509 0.199
Spec Hosp x Deprivation (poorest half) 0.364 0.257 0.156
Spec Hosp x Pre Em Admit -0.034 0.118 0.775
Notes: The sample includes all hip replacements of a random sample of 1000 GP
practices and who chose one of the ten closes hospitals to the centroid of their LSOA.
Random coefficients are estimated at the GP level.
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